The threat to the economy from espionage, cyberattacks, and organised crime continues to grow: Espionage by foreign intelligence services and competing companies as well as cyberattacks pose a serious threat to the German economy. Companies' know-how is systematically siphoned off, for example, through electronic attacks on IT infrastructure or the use of human sources. This does not only affect financial, pharmaceutical, telecommunications and high-tech companies, but also "hidden champions". 

Small and medium-sized enterprises are repeatedly affected as well. Therefore, all companies are required to become more aware of the dangers posed by economic crime such as theft, loss of know-how, cyberattacks, and similar offences, and implement appropriate security measures. 

The German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (IHKs) provide information on general risks and threats posed by espionage and cybercrime, as well as on preventive measures. In addition, however, targeted information on dangerous situations is required from security authorities, and above all, effective and local structures are needed to offer specific support to SMEs in cases of attacks. 

The cooperation between business and state should be further nurtured and expanded in the interest of broad-based information and support services, in order to achieve a regular, trustful exchange at eye level between state institutions and the economy, preferably proactively rather than reactively, for example when a cyberattack has already occurred. To increase the economy's trust in the work of state security authorities in dealing with cyberattacks and espionage, these institutions should engage in open exchange with the economy and make their working methods and support offers transparent, especially when dealing with and tracking IT security incidents.

Politics and administration should specifically help to prevent economic espionage, sabotage, and cyberattacks effectively, among other things, through warnings, and in the event of an incident, provide companies with support in processing and strengthening them in an unbureaucratic manner. Cybercrime in particular should be pursued more intensively. Effective measures are needed in this context to prevent, for example, the misuse of digital currencies for criminal transactions. Economic espionage should be politically outlawed internationally. Consideration could be given to increasing the penalties for professional industrial espionage, especially from abroad via the internet and malware.

The German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK) supports and recognizes measures against money laundering and terrorism as vital goals. Effective regulations must focus on professional and organized money laundering without overburdening businesses.

Preventing money laundering and combating terrorism are important goals acknowledged and supported by businesses since both activities significantly harm the economy. The aim of anti-money laundering regulations should be to effectively prevent professional and organized money laundering. However, such regulations should not lead to companies being overly burdened due to the constant emergence of bureaucratic hurdles. 

Unclear regulations regarding money laundering prevention hinder their practical implementation: impractical identification requirements concerning customers and their beneficial owners, as well as extensive documentation and prevention obligations, result in significant bureaucratic efforts and sometimes insurmountable challenges for businesses. In order to avoid competitive disadvantages for German businesses in an international context, there should be no obligations stricter than those outlined in EU directives.

If an extensive transparency register is to be maintained, it should contribute to greater legal certainty by allowing those required to prevent money laundering to rely on the information contained therein. Family-owned companies, in particular, fear that the extensive possibility of accessing this register may lead to personal safety risks. Even the dual registration requirement in the commercial register and transparency register is perceived by companies as an inappropriate bureaucratic burden; commercial register registration should once again suffice. Specifically, the Federal Office of Administration's penalty practice in connection with the transparency register appears too extensive to many companies. Given the differing regulations at state level for anti-money laundering supervision in the non-financial sector, a uniform application of state supervisory authorities' practices is crucial.

Industrial property rights face frequent threats. Companies find it increasingly challenging to defend their patent, design, and trademark rights, as well as their know-how, in a global business world. International organised crime groups often operate - including through digital channels. Their adaptability and flexibility became particularly evident during the pandemic. The capacity of judiciary, police, customs, and trade supervisory authorities to effectively combat product and trademark piracy is insufficient.

Given the severe risks, effective prosecution of trademark and product piracy should be ensured through improved collaboration among the police, judiciary, customs, and trade supervisory authorities, alongside necessary capacity and expertise enhancement. The dangers of counterfeits should be more widely sensitised by the German Patent and Trademark Office, with contributions from the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (IHKs) and the Action Circle Against Product and Trademark Piracy (APM). Protecting intellectual property should consistently be a regular component of international trade agreements and international legal agreements. Compulsory licences, due to their innovation-inhibiting effects, should be considered only in the narrowest and clearly defined exceptional circumstances, where public interests of overwhelming importance are at stake.

German and European business law has reached a magnitude that makes it barely comprehensible—even for experts. Legal uncertainty and bureaucracy hinder innovation and create new risks for entrepreneurial actions. This significantly increases the demands on internal corporate control systems. 

Legal uncertainty is particularly dangerous for companies in criminal contexts. The criminal offence of breach of trust is hardly limited, and due to case law, it is scarcely understandable even for experts. Genuine or perceived "corporate scandals" thus lead to calls for "punishing" the company and, consequently, all employees and shareholders, rather than individual guilty parties.

Politics, law enforcement authorities, and the judiciary should work together to provide clear and comprehensible laws and achieve their consistent application nationally, but also across Europe and internationally. 

It is also important that companies can identify which authority within the federal government is the proper point of contact. Competencies should be clearly defined, harmonised, and made distinctly noticeable to the companies. 

There is an increasing trend in politics and society to criminalise businesses, which includes calls for corporate criminal law. Entrepreneurial actions are repeatedly questioned, with liability discussed in Germany without guilt and introduced in individual sectors within the EU. The creation of corporate criminal law is unnecessary and rejected by businesses.

Conversely, it would be worth considering increasing the resources for the public prosecutor's office or regulating possible gaps through administrative offences law. It is crucial to – unlike at present – recognise compliance measures as excluding offences, or at least reducing or excluding fines. If businesses, according to their size, have done everything possible to prevent legal violations, this must be considered. Businesses should be able to discern what measures will be judged appropriate to achieve exclusion from penalties or at least mitigation.

It should also be avoided to compensate for a lack of capacity on the part of public prosecutors by excessive cooperation obligations of businesses, thereby effectively privatising prosecution through shifting to companies. Moreover, it must be ensured that fines are proportionate and appropriate. Revenue-related fines, especially when based on corporate turnover, appear questionable.